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BIANNUAL SURVEY

forty-five day demand, he would nevertheless be immunized from
a CPLR 3216 motion during the six months subsequent to joinder
by virtue of the same amendment that furnished the forty-five day
demand.
There are several explanations for delay which the courts will
accept to overcome the motion and a strong showing of merit may
also suffice as a valid defense.17 5 Pursuant to the apparent meaning
of Salama, and the more explicit statements of a few trial courts in
the second department,1 76 plaintiff is encouraged to rest upon his
rights for so long as he might choose-even years past the expiration of the statute of limitations-and still be entitled to forty-five
days to revive his claim.
CPLR 3216: Dismissal held available against third-party plaintiff.
In New Paltz Growers, Inc. v. Jersey Ice Mach. Co.,

77

appar-

ently the only reported post-amendment third department case to
consider the failure-to-prosecute dismissal, the Ulster County
Supreme Court granted a third-party defendant's 3216 motion to
dismiss the third-party claim. The court refused to consider the
motion for its application to the plaintiff's main action, stating:
The third-party plaintiff by commencing the third-party action, interjected
itself as an aggressor plaintiff party and assumed the duties and responsibilities
of a plaintiff in pressing its action. It had the right to bring motions for
If a delay was avoidable, it is no excuse
dismissal under CPLR 3216 ....
to lay it at the door of the plaintiff in the main action. The third-party
or lack of activity and must justify the
plaintiff stands on his own activity 78
delay with some reasonable excuse.'

The court stated (following the first department holdings alluded
to above) that since the dismissal was based upon general delay,
the forty-five day demand was unnecessary.
Although the Salama case would now seem to require the
forty-five day demand, the disposition of the instant case is nonetheless difficult to justify.
Since impleader in New York is available only for indemnity,
it seems inappropriate to lay the burden of prosecution on the
third-party plaintiff, even as to the third-party claim. In that claim,
defendant (third-party plaintiff) is seeking only to be made whole
for whatever the main plaintiff recovers from him. If the main
claim is delayed-and Sortino and its progeny provides that the
175Giordano v. St Clare's Hospital, 24 App. Div. 2d 568, 262 N.Y.S.2d 61
(2d Dep't 1965). Contra, New Paltz Growers, Inc. v. Jersey Ice Mach. Co.,

supra note 174.

176 See cases cited note 173 supra.

177 Supra note 174.
178 New Paltz Growers, Inc. v. Jersey Ice Mach. Co., supra note 174,
at 953, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
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defendant is under no burden to help the plaintiff move the main
case-there is nothing defendant can accomplish by advancing the
indemnity claim since it depends upon the outcome of the main
claim. The New Paltz result would be understandable if the main
claim were ready and if it were shown that only the third-party
claim had been delayed. There was, however, no such showing.
Thus, New Paltz advocates the proposition that the defendant may
be compelled to push to completion a claim for indemnity that does
not have its genesis until the main claim has decided that the
defendant is entitled to indemnity.
CPLR 3216: Failure to perfect appeal subject to dismissal for
neglect to prosecute.
Attention should also be directed to laxity in the perfection of
appeals. The first department, again the leader in the war on
lethargic claimants, has already made clear its intolerance for
unexcused delay at this stage.1 7 9 Only recently, the fourth department which previously had, by its own admission, granted extensions
to perfect appeals as a matter of course notwithstanding blatant
disobedience to the rules of the department and directives of the
court, altered its policy. It was held in Caira v. McKenn&80 that
real justification, by affidavit, would be essential to resist dismissal
for unexcused neglect in the process of appealing to the fourth
department.
The trend by the courts toward increased dismissals for neglect
to prosecute is evident from initial summons to final judgment on
appeal and it would appear that this trend is continuing. It encourages the expeditious disposition of litigation and relief to overburdened calendars and offers a better opportunity for justice to all
parties.
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CPLR 3404: Automatic dismissals.
In Tactuk v. Freiberg,'8 ' an action for wrongful death and
personal injuries, the lower court denied plaintiff's motion to vacate
an "automatic" dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3404. This section
specifically states that when a case is struck from the calendar, or
left unanswered and not restored within one year, it is deemed
abandoned and automatically dismissed. 182
179 Tonkonogy v. Jaffin,
Dep't 1964).
18023 App. Div. 2d 325,
1s124 App. Div. 2d 503,
182 CPLR 3404.
See 4
PRAcicEn
13404.02 (1965).

21 App. Div. 2d 264, 249 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1st
261 N.Y.S.2d 365 (4th Dep't 1965).
261 N.Y.S.2d 438 (2d Dep't 1965).
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